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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDDY N. BETENSON, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
CALL AUTO & EQUIPMENT SALES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
et al., 
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Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
CALL AUTO & EQUIPMENT SALES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
et al., 
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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
CASE NO. 17600 
This is a consolidation of two actions, alleging breach 
of contract, fraud, and violation of state securities laws 
brought by investors in a heavy equipment business. With 
respect to Respondent Fireman's Fund Insurance Company (here-
inafter "Fireman's Fund"), the actions are for recovery under 
a motor vehicle dealer's bond. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted respondent's motions to dismiss 
and denied appellants' motions for reconsideration or modi-
fication. No judgments have been entered by the lower court 
with respect to any defendants other than respondent Fireman's 
Fund. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have this Court affirm the final 
judgments entered by the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants allege defendants Call Auto & Equipment Sales, 
Inc., Call Call, Inc. and Barlow Enterprises, Inc. were eng~~ 
in the business of purchasing, refurbishing and selling heavy 
construction equipment. They further allege defendants Elroy 
Barlow, Timothy Barlow, Elroy Barlow, Jr. and L. A. Campbell 
were officers, directors and shareholders of the corporate 
defendants and "dominated and controlled the corporate defen-
dants such that the corporate defendants were merely their 
alter-ego, and the separate entity of the corporations should 
be disregarded " (R. 3)1 
1As stated in footnote 2, page 2 of Appellants' Brief, the 
allegations of the complaints in the two actions, insofar 
as relevant to these appeals, are the same. All cites are 
to the Betenson record, unless the Lowin record is express-
ly designated. 
-2-
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During 1979 and 1980, defendant Elroy Barlow allegedly 
solicited appellants to invest money with said defendants. 
(R. 4) The basis of their investments is set forth in para-
graph seven of the Betenson Complaint as follows: 
In or about August 1979 defendant Elroy T. Barlow, 
acting on behalf of all defendants, solicited plaintiff 
Betenson for the purpose of raising funds for the cor-
porate defendants. At that time, said defendant repre-
sented to Betenson that defendants were engaged in the 
business of purchasing, refurbishing and selling heavy 
construction equipment and were in immediate need of 
funds to purchase certain equipment which could be re-
furbished and sold at substantial profits. Said defen-
dant represented to Betenson that if he would invest 
funds for a joint venture to purchase, refurbish and 
sell such equipment, that such investment would at all 
times be fully secured by various personal property 
and equipment of the corporate defendants and that 
Betenson would receive a guaranteed profit for his 
investment. (R. 3). 
Each investment was represented by a written agreement. 
The written agreements were identical in form; copies are 
attached as Exhibits A, B, c, D, F, G, and H to the Betenson 
Complaint and Exhibit A to the Lowin Complaint. 2 The agree-
ments provide in pertinent part: 
2Exhibit F is alleged in paragraph 39 of the Betenson Com-
plaint, but the exhibit is not attached to the complaint 
contained in the record. 
-3-
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WHEREAS, SECOND PARTY has approached first party 
for the purpose of entering into an investment in their 
business as a type of joint venture, and: 
WHEREAS, each of the parties have obtained indepen-
dent legal counsel and are fully aware of this business 
transaction: 
* * * * 
1. FIRST PARTY herewith pays over to SECOND PARTY 
the sum of $ cash to be used by SECOND 
PARTY in buying and selling various types of personal 
property and equipment at a profit in its business. 
2. SECOND PARTY agrees and guarantees to pay 
over to the FIRST PARTY, as his or her share of the 
profits and investment, the following sums of money 
on the following dates: ••• (R. 20) 
The agreements further provide that the investments 
are to be secured by personal property and equipment, but 
that such property can be dealt with at a profit by the de-
fendants if they deem it expedient and proper. Each agree-
ment also contains a renewal clause, continuing the invest-
ments under the same terms for specified periods of time if 
the parties so wish. 
Appellants allege breach of contract, fraud and a viola-
tion of state securities laws with respect to each of the 
agreements, and specifically allege that they entered into 
the agreements and invested their money in reliance on the 
representations of defendant Elroy Barlow set forth in para-
graph 7 of the Betenson Complaint. 
-4-
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Appellants' claim against Respondent Fireman's Fund is 
based on a motor vehicle dealer's bond which it issued to 
defendant Call Auto. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS WERE PARTICIPANTS IN A JOINT 
VENTURE WITH DEFENDANTS AND THEREFORE 
CANNOT RECOVER AGAINST THE DEALER'S BOND 
Appellants rely on Section 41-3-18 Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
as amended, for their c:ause of action against respondent. 
This section provides a cause of action against motor vehicle 
dealers and their sureties in favor of persons damaged by 
reason of the dealer's fraud or violation of the provisions 
of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act. 
The trial court held the right of action provided in 
§41-3-18 does not apply to appellants because they were en-
gaged in a joint venture with the defendants. This ruling 
is supported by Utah case law. In Bates v. Simpson, 121 
Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749 (1952) this court impliedly held that 
a joint venturer with the principal on a dealer's bond can-
not recover against the bond. The reasoning of ~· and 
of the trial court in this case, is sound. The dealer's 
bond statutes are intended only to protect members of the 
public who deal with the dealer in a commercial capacity. 
To allow a joint venturer to recover against the 
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principal's bond allows the joint venturer, in essence, to 
recover against his own bond. 
Appellants concede they are not entitled to recover 
against the bond if their relationships with defendants were 
joint ventures, but argue their transactions with defendants 
were loans. The issue before this court on appeal is whether 
the lower court erred in finding as a matter of law that 
appellants' agreements with defendants were joint ventures 
rather than loans. The. trial court's ruling was correct 
and should be affirmed for the following reasons: 
A. Appellants Have Judicially Admitted They Were 
Joint Venturers. 
Appellants, by their own admissions, were engaged in 
joint ventures with the defendants. In paragraph 7 of the 
Betenson Complaint, appellants allege: 
Said defendant represented to Betenson that if he would 
invest funds for a joint venture to purchase, reburbish 
and sell such equipment, ••• Betenson would receive 
a guaranteed profit for his investment. (R. 3). 
In paragraph 8 of the Betenson complaint, appellents 
allege that the investments alleged in the complaints, as 
represented by the agreements attached as exhibits to the 
complaints, were made "in reliance upon such representations". 
Accordingly, appellants admit they made their investments 
and signed the agreements with the understanding that they 
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would be engaged in a joint venture with the defendants 
to purchase, refurbish and sell equipment to make a profit. 
The allegations of joint ventures in the complaints 
are binding judicial admissions and appellants cannot now 
assert a position directly contrary to their pleadings. 
As stated in 4 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.) 45, Sl064: 
The pleadings in a cause are, for the purposes of the 
use in that suit, not mere ordinary admissions ••• 
but judicial admissions, •• • : i.e., they are not means 
of evidence, but a waiver of all controversy (so far 
as the opponent may~esire to take advantage of them) 
and therefore a limitation of the issues. 
The principle stated by Wigmore regarding judicial ad-
missions in pleadings has been applied by this court. In 
Estate of Clarence Henry McFarland v. Holt, 18 Utah 2d 127, 
417 P.2d 244 (1966), the executrix under a will sought to 
set aside an order confirming the sale of real property which 
had been entered pursuant to her own petition. The lower 
court denied the motion and this court affirmed, holding: 
One who files a pleading asking the court to act there-
on vouches for its verity and should not thereafter be 
permitted to repudiate it for the purpose of.upsetting 
the action the court has taken pursuant to his request. 
Id. at 245. 
Other jurisdictions have also applied this principle. 
In Myers v. Carter, 556 P.2d 703, (Or. 1976) the trial court 
was reversed for submitting an issue to the jury which was 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
admitted in a letter attached to and incorporated in the 
plaintiff's complaint. The Oregon court held: 
Statements contained in the pleadings are considered 
conclusive judicial admissions. (Citations omitted) 
Thus, whatever evidence may have been adduced at trial 
the facts contained in that letter are conclusively ' 
established. Id. at 707. 
As stated in the above authorities, plaintiffs' allega-
tions of joint ventures in their pleadings are not merely 
evidence which they may now refute with contrary claims, but 
are admissions which remove all controversy as to the rela-
tionship between appellants and the defendants. Based on 
appellants own pleadings there is no issue to be determined 
by the court or submitted to a jury concerning the relation-
ships between appellants and defendants. It is conclusively 
established by appellants' judicial admissions that the rela-
tionship between the parties was that of joint venturers. 
B. Appellants Are Bound by the Terms of the Written 
Agreements. 
Appellants contend that although the written agreements 
expressly provide for a joint venture, they should be allowed 
to introduce evidence that the parties to the agreements in-
tended otherwise. Appellants recite several factual allega-
tions in their brief attempting to show intent contrary to 
the express provisions of the agreements. (Appellants' Brief, 
pp. 16-17) They also cite the cases of Bender v. Bender, 
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397 P.2d 957 (Mont. 1965), Porter v. Moore, 300 P.2d 513 
(Mont. 1956) and Vineland Hornes v. Barish, 292 P.2d 941 (Cal. 
App. 1956) in support of their argument that the intent of 
the parties rather than the express provisions of the written 
agreements should govern. Each of those cases is distinguish-
able from the factual setting presented by this appeal. 
Bender and Porter involve disputes between the parties to 
the alleged partnership agreement. Vineland Hornes involves 
an oral partnership agreement, the terms and existence of 
which must, of necessify, be proved by parol evidence. 
In this case, respondent is not a party to the written 
agreements executed by appellant which created the joint 
ventures. Although the intention of the parties to a contract 
may govern their contractual relationship, as to third par-
ties the express language of the contract governs. ~ 
Weller, Inc. v. Hansen, 517 P.2d 1110 (Ariz. App. 1973)1 
Stearns v. Williams, 240 P.2d 833 (Idaho 1952)1 Lepel v. 
Lepel, 456 P.2d 249 (Idaho 1969). 
In James Weller, Inc. v. Hansen, supra, plaintiffs Han-
sen and Cherokee Construction Company were involved in several 
real estate transactions. Cherokee deeded property to Han-
sen, who obtained financing to build thereon. Hansen deeded 
the property back to Cherokee, which started construction 
and contracted with Weller to perform dry wall and paint-
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ing work. After construction was completed, Cherokee deeded 
the property back to Hansen. Subsequently, Weller filed a 
mechanics lien, naming Cherokee as owner. Cherokee received 
timely notice, but Hansen did not receive notice of the lien 
until three months later. After receiving notice of the 
lien, Hansen brought an action against Weller to quiet title 
and Weller counterclaimed to foreclose its lien. Hansen 
defended the counterclaim on the grounds that he had not 
received proper and timely notice of the lien. Weller con-
tended that a joint venture existed between Hansen and Chere-
kee and the notice to Cherokee was therefore adequate notice 
to Hansen. The lower court granted judgment to Hansen, but 
the Appellate Court reversed, holding that a joint venture 
did exist as to Weller, a third party. The court stated: 
While the intent of the parties is essential as between 
the parties, where there is a clear and unambiguous 
contract, as here, the contract controls as to Weller, 
a third party. 
* * * * 
The intent of the contracting parties to 
form a partnership is always an essential element of a 
partnership relation as between the parties themselves, 
but as to third parties, the relation will b7 deter-
mined from the facts rather than the conclusions of 
the co-partners as to the nature of their business 
relationship. 
Id., 517 P.2d at 1114-15, citing Mercer v. Vinson, 336 P.2d 
854, 858 (Ariz. 1959). 
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The agreements in the present case are consistent and 
unambiguous. They expressly provide that the purpose of 
the agreements is "entering into an investment ••• as a 
type of joint venture." Consistent with that purpose the 
agreements provide that the investments are to be used "in 
buying and selling various types of personal property and 
equipment at a profit" and that appellants are to receive 
certain payments "as his or her share of the profits and 
investment." There is no uncertainty or ambiguity on the 
face of the agreements as to the nature of the relationship 
between the parties thereto. Accordingly, as to third par-
ties such as respondent, appellants are bound by the express 
provisions of the agreements which they voluntarily signed 
while being represented and advised by counsel. 
It is apparent from the agreements that particular care 
was taken in structuring the transactions and drafting the 
agreements as joint ventures so as to avoid the appearance 
of a loan. The terms "joint venture," "investments" and 
"profits" were specifically used in the agreements and terms 
such as loan, debt, note and interest are noticeably absent 
in the agreements. Although appellants' brief alleges notes 
were signed "in some cases," according to the pleadings a 
note was signed in connection with the agreements in only 
one instance. In that case, the note does not conform to 
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the agreement with respect to the dollar amount and the 
interest rate is conspicuously left blank. (R. 26-28). 
The reasons the agreements specify joint ventures rather 
than loans are not totally clear from the record, but it is 
significant that the agreements, if deemed loans, would pro-
vide interest rates ranging from 30% to 120% per annum. 
Whatever the reasons for establishing joint ventures rather 
than loans, the written agreements are clear and unambiguous 
and govern as to third pa~ties such as respondent. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO LEAVE TO 
AMEND THEIR COMPLAINTS AND THE TRIAL COURT 
DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THEIR MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
After the trial court entered the orders dismissing 
the complaints, appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
or Modification of Order Granting Motion to Dismiss. The 
trial court's denial of that motion was correct and should 
be affirmed for the following reasons: 
A. Leave to Amend the Complaints was Not Timely 
Sought. 
Appellants did not move for leave to amend their com-
plaints prior to entry of the orders of dismissal. AppellanU 
have never filed a proper motion for leave to amend the 
complaints. Nevertheless their Motions for Reconsideration 
state as a ground for the motions that they are entitled to 
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amend the complaints. This court has twice held that leave 
to amend a complaint will not be granted after an action 
has been dismissed. Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 
1976)i Steiner v. State, 27 Utah 2d 284, 495 P.2d 809 (1972). 
In Nichols v. State, supra, the plaintiff filed a motion 
for leave to amend her complaint after the defendants' motion 
to dismiss had been granted. The trial court denied the 
motion for leave to amend and this court affirmed, holding: 
Utah has adopted the majority rule that an 
order of dismissa~ is a final adjudication, and 
thereafter, a plaintiff may not file an amended 
complaint. Id. at 232. 
Assuming, arguendo, appellants' motion for reconsidera-
tion is considered a motion for leave to amend, it was not 
timely and the trial court was correct in denying the motion. 
B. Appellants' Motions for Reconsideration Are Not 
Proper Motions. 
After entry of the orders dismissing their complaints, 
appellants filed Motions for Reconsideration on the alleged 
grounds that substantial evidence and authorities existed 
which had not been brought to the attention of the trial 
court. The motions did not purport to be made pursuant to 
Rules 59 or 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and none of 
the grounds for post-judgment relief under those rules were 
asserted. 
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In Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 
(1966) the district court entered judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff in an automobile accident case. Two months later 
the judge granted defendants' motion for new trial. The 
plaintiff then filed a motion to reconsider and set aside 
the order granting new trial. That motion was granted and 
the original judgment reinstated by the trial court. On 
appeal, this court reversed and remanded the case to the 
trial court for a new trial, holding: 
It is signlfidant that our Rules of Civil Proce-
dure do not provide for a motion for the trial court 
to reconsider or to review its ruling. • • Undoubtedly 
this is advisedly so •• 
When this has been done and the court has ruled 
upon the motion, if the party ruled against were per-
mitted to go beyond the rules, make a motion for recon-
sideration, and persuade the judge to reverse himself, 
the question arises, why should not the other party 
who is now ruled against be permitted to make a motion 
for re-re-consideration, asking the court to again 
reverse himself? 
In order to avoid such a state of indecision for both 
the judge and the parties, practical expediency demands 
that there be some finality to the actions of the court, 
and he should not be in the position of having the fur-
ther duty of acting as a court of review upon his own 
ruling. 
Id. 415 P.2d at 663-64. 
Although the trial court did hear appellants' motions 
for reconsideration, before denying them, it could have pro-
perly denied the motions without hearing. 
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C. Appellants' Proposed Amendments Would Directly 
Contradict Their Original Pleadings Which Are 
Judicial Admissions. ' 
Appellants argue they should be granted leave to amend 
their complaints to allege that the transactions between 
them and defendants were loans and not joint ventures. This 
is not a case of appellants having merely omitted an allega-
tion essential to state a claim. Appellants pled the trans-
actions as joint ventures and submitted the matter for deci-
sion to the lower court upon the premise that a joint ven-
turer is entitled to recover against a dealer's bond. By 
the trial court's decision, appellants discovered they were 
not entitled to recover against respondent based on the facts 
pled. Failing there, appellants now want to change horses 
in midstream. They now argue they should have been allowed 
to amend their complaints to plead facts in direct contra-
diction to the facts pled in their original complaints. 
The granting or denying of leave to amend is a matter 
within the discretion of the trial court and its ruling will 
be reversed only upon a finding that it abused its discretion. 
Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980)1 Department of 
Social Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1980)1 Hoover 
Equipment Co. v. Smith, 198 Kan. 127, 422 P.2d 914 (1967). 
The trial court certainly did not abuse its discretion in 
denying appellants leave to amend their complaints to plead 
facts directly contrary to their prior admissions. 
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D. Even if Appellants Had Been Granted Leave to 
Amend Their Complaints to Allege Loans Rather 
Than Joint Ventures, They Would Not Be Entitled 
to Recover Against the Dealer's Bond Because 
the Transactions, If Loans, Were Illegal and 
Unconscionable. 
Under the Utah enactment of the Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code, S70B-3-602(1) Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, appel-
lants' agreements with the defendants, if deemed loans, would 
be consumer related loans. Consumer-related loans to persons 
other than organizations are usurious and illegal if the 
finance charge exceeds J8%. S70B-3-201(1) and S70B-3-602(2). 
Appellants allege that the individual defendants, at all 
relevant times, dominated and controlled the corporate defen-
dants such that the corporate defendants were merely their 
alter-ego and the separate entity of the corporations should 
be disregarded in this action. (R. 2, 3). 
Based on the agreements incorporated in the complaints, 
appellants were to receive interest at the following rates 
if the transactions are deemed loans: 
Eddie N. Betenson 
120% per annum on $7,000 - Exhibit A to Betenson 
Complaint 
60% per annum on $10,000 - Exhibit B to Betenson 
Complaint 
60% per annum on $2,000 - Exhibit C to Betenson 
Complaint 
Gregory Johnson 
120% per annum on $900 - Exhibit D to Betenson 
Complaint 
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Alice Adams 
60% per annum on $2,000 - No exhibit 
Randall Adams 
60% per annum on $6,000 - Exhibit G to Betenson 
Complaint 
45% per annum on $10,000 - Exhibit H to Betenson 
Complaint 
Eugene and Genevia Lowin 
30% per annum on $30,000 - Exhibit A to Lowin 
Complaint 
Usurious loans are void and unenforceable. Ross v. 
Producers Mutual Insurance Co., 4 Utah 2d 396, 295 P.2d 339 
(1956). See also §70B-_5...;301, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as 
amended, which makes it a misdemeanor to willfully charge 
more than the usury limit. 
Since appellants' agreements with defendants, if deemed 
loans, are unenforceable, appellants would have no right to 
recover against the bond. Otherwise, appellants would bene-
fit from their own illegal acts. Furthermore, respondent, 
as surety, cannot be held liable on the basis of a transac-
tion or obligation which cannot be enforced against its 
principal. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in not 
allowing appellants to amend the complaints to allege their 
agreements were loans rather than joint ventures. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's ruling that appellants were engaged 
in joint ventures and are therefore not entitled to recover 
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against the bond was correct and should be affirmed for two 
reasons: 
1. Appellants admitted in their pleadings that they 
invested money in joint ventures with the defendants. These 
allegations in the complaints constitute judicial admissions. 
Accordingly, there was no issue before the trial court as 
to the nature of the relationships between appellants and 
the defendants and the court properly applied the law to 
the facts as established :by appellants' own pleadings. 
2. The written a-greements between appellants and the 
defendants were placed before the court by appellants. Tho~ 
documents expressly provide, without ambiguity, that the 
agreements between appellants and the defendants are joint 
ventures and not loans. As to third parties such as respon-
dent, the terms of the written agreements govern and appel-
lants are not entitled to contradict those terms by extrin-
sic evidence of their intent. 
The trial court properly denied appellants' motion for 
reconsideration for the following reasons: 
1. To the extent appellants were requesting leave to 
amend their complaints by the motion for reconsideration, 
their request was untimely. Leave to amend a complaint can-
not be granted after the complaint has been dismissed. 
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2. Motions to reconsider are not recognized under 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and this court has expressly 
held that such motions are improper. 
3. Appellants' proposed amendments would directly 
contradict the judicial admissions made in their original 
complaints. The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to allow appellants to amend their complaints 
to plead facts directly contrary to facts already admitted. 
4. Appellants' ag~eements with the defendants, if 
deemed loans rather than joint ventures, were usurious and 
illegal. It is no wonder such care was taken in the draft-
ing of the agreements between appellants and defendants to 
avoid the appearance of loans, in view of the fact that the 
interest rates would have been up to 120% per annum. 
DATED this 22.icl day of July, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
\ 
By ))c;__ / d tu,!/s-
Dav id G.rwilliams 
By ©,u<<Y!;Pvi~ 
Bruce H. Jensel) / 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies of the with-
in Brief of Respondent to Stephen B. Mitchell, at Burbidge, Mabey 
& Mitchell, Attorneys for Appellant, at 438 East 200 South, Suite 
1, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid in the United 
States Mail, this =~nJ day of July, 1981. 
-- Bruce JenseJ9 
Attorney for Respondent 
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